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Representation Begins at Home: A Response to Eston McKeague

Frederik Matthys and Peter Linnér
2 hours ago
4 min read
An empty parliamentary chamber with green benches facing a central table and the Speaker’s chair

Opinion pieces reflect the views of their authors, not of Young World Federalists. This is a response to Eston McKeague’s “Democratizing the Power of the UN’s Purse”.


Eston McKeague of the Young World Federalists reacted to my call to react to our policy brief “Financing Without Strings Attached” Peter Linnér and myself wrote as part of a broader set of briefs to renew multilateralism.


We very much appreciate his thoughtful feedback. We share his starting point. Earmarking concentrates informal power over the United Nations in a handful of capitals, and any move towards financial autonomy must be matched by stronger accountability. Where we differ is on where that accountability should be anchored.


McKeague argues that because our first model is calibrated on Gross National Income, the “global taxpayer” would fund the UN without a say in how. We do have a different interpretation on GNI. The levy – based on GNI – is not a tax on citizens. GNI is a yardstick of each state’s capacity to pay. The contribution itself comes out of national budgets that national parliaments already debate and vote on. This is precisely why we chose an assessment under Article 17 of the UN Charter over an independently collected global tax. The chain of representation he finds missing does exist. It runs through national legislatures.


The weakness lies in that chain, not in its absence. Parliaments rarely debate the United Nations at all, let alone scrutinise what their delegations say in the Fifth Committee or on executive boards, and the same government often takes different positions in New York, in Geneva and at home. A global assembly would add a layer above this incoherence without repairing it. We would rather see citizens give their governments a clearer mandate before they go to New York: public debates through real participatory processes, regular parliamentary debates on the national position towards the UN as a whole and on its funding in particular, public reporting on how delegations vote, and multi-year commitments to core funding written into national law. Representation begins at home.


There is however a big risk and tension that’s difficult – or at least not easy – to manage. In donor countries, parliamentary scrutiny is itself a driver of earmarking, because legislators want visibility and control over their contributions. A stronger national mandate serves autonomy only if it is a mandate for the multilateral system as a whole, not for national control over each allocation. Building that mandate is public work in which parliamentarians, civil society and young people have a real role, as McKeague rightly argues.


The United Nations itself has a part to play here. Parliaments can only oversee what they see, and today the UN speaks mostly to governments. It should reach out systematically to national legislatures, in donor countries and in the countries where it operates alike. In donor capitals, agency heads and Secretariat officials could appear regularly before foreign affairs, development and budget committees to present results, funding needs and the case for core over earmarked resources. In programme countries, Resident Coordinators and country teams could present the Cooperation Framework and how it is financed to the national parliament, so that the people the UN serves have a voice through their own representatives. Wherever possible, these sessions should be open to the interested public, in person or broadcast. Oversight conducted in the open is what gives a more autonomous UN the legitimacy it will need.


We accept that “governments represent their citizens” holds only weakly where governments are not freely elected. A parliamentary assembly faces the same difficulty, however: members drawn from those states’ legislatures would largely reproduce the governments they are meant to check.


To McKeague’s three questions, briefly.


  1. Who should the fiduciary board answer to? The General Assembly, which in our design decides programme allocations; the board’s remit is limited to investment policy and drawdowns. Its reporting can still be built for wider scrutiny, for instance an annual public report that national parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union can debate in sessions open to the public.


  2. A parliamentary oversight body during the pilot phase? We are not opposed in principle to a parliamentary dimension at the UN. Our point is one of sequence: strengthen the national mandate and parliamentary oversight first, and let the reserve facility and pilot endowment build their track record through existing channels.


  3. Is a Charter amendment needed? We agree that what one Assembly majority adopts, another can undo. Entrenchment is best pursued once the models have proven themselves, and an Article 109 conference would be the right place for a protected endowment and a fairer scale.


On progressivity we agree fully: contributions should track ability to pay, and the scale must be defended in public. That, too, is what national parliaments already do with domestic taxation.


We are grateful for the exchange and glad to continue it.


About the authors

Frederik Matthys is Senior Advisor and Founder of Tomorrow Is Possible, an independent advisory practice. He previously served as Head of Division for Policies and Networks at the OECD and led UN development reform workstreams at the UN Development Coordination Office, and he teaches development cooperation at Sciences Po Paris.


Peter Linnér is Programme Director for UN Funding and Effectiveness at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. He has over 25 years of experience in international development, peacebuilding and humanitarian affairs, including 10 years in the UN system and 15 years at Sida and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

 
 
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