Pancivist Federalism: Egalitarianism Demands One State


Opinion pieces reflect the views of their authors, not of Young World Federalists. A response from YWF board member Gideon Ong runs alongside this piece.
Where you are born should no more decide whether your life is protected than your race should. That is why I argue that every person needs one citizenship in one global state, and why world federalists should accept that conclusion.
Even though Black people are not equal de facto in American courts, they are de jure equal citizens to their white counterparts. This was a recent, legitimate change that needed to be made before Black Americans could ever stop being second-class citizens. I’ll later define Pancivism, and it should be apparent by the end that it's a necessary position for world federalists to take.
Birthplace is as arbitrary to whether your life and rights should be protected as race is. We would never accept differential citizenship based on mere race, so we shouldn’t accept it based on birthplace. This means that we need one citizenship for each and every person. Any framework that rejects racism and sexism on arbitrariness grounds is, by the same reasoning, absolutely obligated to reject nationalism in the same fashion. Weak federations of nation-states akin to something like the EU keep something akin to the segregationist “separate but equal” myth, and are not just. If one administration is permitted to switch off the worth of a “foreigner”, this federation would be nationalism tied together with string. Here, I’ll run through why certain impermissible borders discriminate by birthplace, what exactly is meant when I say arbitrary, why Pancivism isn’t just all world federalism, the choice every federation faces about its borders, and finally how Pancivists should deal with the strongest objection, the risk of tyranny.
The only stance to take after establishing egalitarian moral worth is Pancivism, an identity-forming belief in the destruction of a plurality of nation-states and the construction of one global state. The name itself is the thesis: pan (all) + civis (citizen). Moral egalitarianism in a realist world requires one to believe that every person be a citizen of one shared political community.
By nationalism I mean the belief in any framework that hands out moral standing/rights according to national belonging: any rule under which basic rights and protection depend on membership. The line at which such rules take effect I call a “wall”.
There is a “border” and distance of some kind between any two administrative districts in a federation for the sake of practicality, say, Maine and Hawaii. However, there is about the same distance between Washington D.C. and Tripoli. This border is not merely administrative. Nation-state difference serves more than local governance: it protects lives differentially. One can legally drone strike across this border, kill many, many people, and the nationalist may still call the murderer a hero. Nothing about the worth of people in these three places changes, but only the second distance contains a wall, and nothing about birthplace can justify it.
Rights-based moral philosophy tends to assert that distinctions are “morally arbitrary” and then treat that label as decisive ground to build off of, while rarely saying what is actually meant by that label. Let’s fix this by defining what I actually mean when I call something “arbitrary”: a criterion is deemed arbitrary relative to a good when said criterion does not track anything that the good is for. For example, my father is bald. His baldness may be arbitrary relative to what color tie I buy for him on his birthday, while not arbitrary and indeed extremely significant to whether or not I buy him a comb.
Every function of the state is at the base level for the protection of the continuation of persons’ lives, and this is what the good is uncontroversially, universally, and primarily for. In the plurality of nation-states, belonging is assigned universally and primarily by facts of birth: where you were born and to whom. Birth facts are arbitrary in that they track nothing about the life that they are attached to, and whether or not that life should be protected. Thus the pluralistic nation-state system, by counting national belonging as the criterion for the protection of your life, has sorted human beings into classes of worth by birthplace.
If I were to define a water fountain as “only for whites” and then point at the “whites only” sign, I’ve defined the membership relevant to the job, but I’ve done so by stipulation: it’s only relevant because I said so, and has nothing to do with the actual water. In the same way, if I define an institution such that membership guarantees protection “merely for members,” we run into the same problem.
Pancivism is not all world federalism, nor Kant’s federation of free states. Held and Archibugi are not Pancivist. Wendt and Cabrera’s end-states both count as Pancivist by the test I set out here. Though certain kinds of world federalism may satisfy the conditions of legitimate governance, Pancivism insists that the wall, and the lower class of worth it protects, must be abolished. Small-scale integration is definitely good, but it will never be just until there is an actual government that protects every person as one of its own. World federations that keep a moral outside, let alone ones that are exitable, are not Pancivist but nationalism tied together with string, and unacceptable.
Let’s take the non-Pancivist federalist ideal end state and see what a commitment to their ideals within such a structure presents - namely, member states keep some sovereignty while the outsider’s worth is fully honored. If it is, emergencies like drowning, famines, and plagues outside of a member state’s borders would be its emergencies just as much as they’re emergencies inside of its borders. Other needs that protect lives, like policing, welfare, and healthcare, are also prioritized for those outside of its borders just as they are for those within. Starting to sound familiar? The line that sorts who votes and draws welfare from specific places within a larger moral community is simply an internal administrative border, like the one between Shandong and Sichuan. This is simply a sector, not a nation.
Either the border is allowed to switch off outsider worth, in which case it creates lives that can be “legitimately” killed without it counting as murder, or it honors the outsider worth completely, in which case the only borders left are ones that Pancivism accepts and that a plurality of nation-states do not. There is no third kind of border.
Proponents of “additive nationalism” often will talk about festivals, sports, language, and culture. Friends, this is not milder nationalism or even nationalism in the slightest. This is simply culture. Pancivism admits and encourages culture; it brings much joy and identity to life. Such a culture becomes a nation only when it draws a border that protects life differentially. Do Black Americans have a nation? Who would say they have no culture? What about the Tamils? And the Yi?
The tyranny objection is impactful on the Pancivist tradition for the primary reason that it speaks in our own terms: valuing lives. It works by claiming that a plurality of nation-states is the only system we’ve tested for many small monopolies on death, and that because previous oppressive tyrannies were toppled by extra-state actors, removing the other sovereigns means tyranny may ensue over the entire world, without ever even mentioning whether or not the plurality of nation-states is just. The Westphalian settlement of 1648 is commonly taken as the start of a system of sovereign states that recognize one another, stay out of each other’s affairs, and keep the peace among themselves. A plurality of sovereigns is, on this view, a ship built with bulkheads: one compartment floods and the vessel stays afloat. We should be careful, because having only one bulkhead means that getting control over one may sink the entire ship: namely that a world dictatorship would oppress everyone instead of merely some people like ordinary dictatorships do. Caplan makes this argument in its effective-altruist form.
It’s a fair objection, not just to Pancivism but to all systems of governance, especially ones you can’t leave, which not only could but currently do create many small tyrannies. Any non-global state still has the license and legitimacy to war on its neighbor. Regardless, you ought to be a Pancivist, and we can, must, and do engineer structures that protect against tyranny. Just as it was America’s responsibility, once abolition was recognized as a moral must, to figure out how to run an economy without slavery, everyone must be a Pancivist because of the principles, which this objection never tries to touch. Let’s examine the legitimacy of this objection anyway.
Westphalian peace is merely peace between the members of the plurality of nation-states, which is a system that we built and sustain. This system licenses and permits murder across borders that it draws, through “just” and unjust war and resource hoarding. War between states is a death that Westphalia’s “peace”(that no one outside Europe enjoys anyways) produces and cannot fight against.
Because the status quo is a system, any comparison between Pancivist systems and their residual risk for tyranny, death, and otherwise must be compared to the system that is the status quo. We’re not comparing against zero risk of despotism; we live in a world where horrible atrocities and tyranny are taking place at the time I write, and you read these words. Nationalism and the plurality of nation-states specifically do more than “risk” oppression: as we established, through defining whose life deserves to be protected, it legitimizes oppression across borders as a standing default, and often legitimizes it within certain borders. The existence of certain borders within nationalism also enforces tyranny in ways that Pancivism will reverse.
So how do we resist tyranny? It’s not absent now, and we can’t simply trust it to be absent later. We must build institutions and governance, especially in Pancivist situations, and Pancivism gives us good methods to guard against tyranny that weren’t there previously. First, any Pancivist system must have some chain of continuous consent, such that any official attempting to enact tyranny is stopped long before they get to a position of significant power. Free, funded movement between regions is one mechanism that Pancivist governance can guarantee while nationalist governance cannot, and it’s a strong resistance against tyranny. The women in Afghanistan cannot travel far without a male guardian under Taliban rules, and those who want to escape that law have few places that will let them in. The Taliban enforce these rules without any global authority to answer to. Dissent should be public and registered, and transparency should always be key, and in Pancivism this is actually enforceable in a way that it’s not currently in the plurality of nation-states, specifically because there is an overarching authority that the individuals must answer to. If the UN today demands that Israel stop its genocide in Gaza, or that China open its internet fully, there is no reason for China or Israel to listen, because there is no actual governance happening at the UN. Pancivist governance would mean that smaller regional leaders would have to answer to the larger global community, which is notoriously hard to capture.
Of course, the international community’s judgement relies on having uncaptured information available to influence their decisions (free media, independent channels, etc.), which now more than ever is looking like a guarantee: the internet and social media, for all of their flaws, are quite efficient at showing information from everyday non-state actors that actually reflects their experience, and they are harder for any government to control than older media were.
I said the government should answer to the people. The first objection is that if groups of people would like to secede and institute nationalism, they should be able to, like Brexit or the Confederacy. I included the latter because it makes my stance on this clear: people have lots of motives for their governmental actions, not all of them just or legitimate, especially never in the case of nationalism. Just as the Confederacy should not be allowed to secede and ensure Black Americans remain second-class citizens, any secessionist nationalism should not be allowed; rather, their views should be represented within the government all the way to whatever apex or federal authority exists.
Even if, in all of our comparison, taking into consideration all counterfactuals, the walled borders proved safer, the borders are still unjust and illegitimate, just as slavery was. It’s then up to us to make the conditions such that just systems can be instituted de facto.
Those that reject racism, sexism, and religious discrimination cannot consistently exempt nationalism from total and complete rejection. It must be rejected outright. Special pleading is now to say that nationalism is for some reason a special exemption. It is not.
About the author
Joshua Wangia is a sophomore at the University of Pennsylvania who writes on global governance on his Substack, joshuawangia.substack.com. His argument is called Pancivism: global justice demands a global state. You can reach him at joshuawangia@gmail.com or follow him on Instagram at @joshua.wangia.


